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strategies,  it is essential  that  the  fiscal  deficit  include  quasi-fiscal
deficits  - the losses of public  financial  institutions  such as the
central  bank.  A flow-of-funds  format  may be the best approach
for doing so. as this case shows.
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This paper - a product of the Private Sector Development  Economics Division, Africa Technical
Department-ispartofa  largereffortinthe  departmentto  assess  the  macroeconomic  impactofquasi-fiscal
deficits.  Copies  of the  paper  are available  free  from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC
20433.  Please  contact  Nydia Velasco,  room  J3-283,  extension  34346 (Febriary  1993,  26 pages).
In practice,  conventional  measures  of the dscal  methodological  and practical  problems  of
deficit  exclude the activities  of public financial  treating  quasi-fiscal  deficits, Le Houerou  and
institutions.  As a result,  fiscal  policies may be  Sierra  propose  using a flow-of-funds  format,
applied  inappropriately  when these  institutions  which  in principle  could  be standardized  across
- especially the central bank - run large losses  countries.
(the quasi-fiscal  deficit).
Using  Madagascar  as an example,  they show
The macroeconomic  effects  of the quasi-  that the public sector  deficit  is significantly
fiscal deficit  are similar  to the effects of the  undervalued  if quasi-fiscal  deficits are not
deficit from other public  entities  - and should  considered.
therefore  be included  in the public deficit.
They  contend  that such deficits  must be
Conceptual  and practical  difficulties  have so  taken into account  in assessing  the success of
far precluded  a definition  of quasi-fiscal  deficits  adjustment  problems  and development  strategies
that is operationally  use:Dd  and comparable  supported  by the IMF and the World  Bank.
across  countries.  After studying  the
hrPolicy Research  WorkingDPiaessmesdisseiinates  thermdingsofwork  uderway in  theBankr  Anobjectiveoftheseries
is to get these  findings  out q!iiclcly.  even if presentations  are  less than  fully  polishedL  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do  not  necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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In many developing  countries  the Central Bank performs "quasi-fiscal"  activities not specifically
conmected  with monetary policy.  The losses incurred by these activities--known  as the "quasi-fiscal"
deficit--may  be huge, as shown by the experience  of many  Latin American  countries  during the debt crisis
of the i980s. In the last five yeaxs  or so. a considerable  amount of effort has been devoted to define
adequate  ways to measure the quasi-fiscal  deficit.  It is now widely agreed that it has macroeconomic
effects similar  to the deficit  of other  public ent! `s. and therefore should be included in the overall fiscal
deficit (see Anand and Van Wijnbergen  (19881,  Robinson  and SteUla  [19881,  Blejer and Cheasty [19911,
Rezende-Rocha  and Saldanha  [  19921.)  The correct  measure  of the quasi-fiscal  deficit is then  a prerequisite
for diagnosing  economic problems  and finding appropriate  fiscal policies to address them.
In most practical applications,  however, conventional  deficit measures include only the central
government. Even in comprehensive  measures  the public financial  institutions  are often  excluded  because
of their special role as financing  agents. One problem  is the practical difficulty  of measuring  the amount
of the losses incurred by these institutions. Quasi-fiscal  deficits are often omitted or blend with other
operating  losses, unless they are too large to ignore (Teijeiro (19891.) Another problem is the country-
specific  nature of the quasi-fiscal  deficits,  which  so far has precluded  a general definition  applicable  across
countxies  and institutions.
Our  main objective  is to present  a stylized  accounting  methodology  to help examine  the underlying
principles behind quasi-fisca' deficits, and to compute them in an operationaUy  meaningful  way.  Our
approach is based on the flow-of-funds  format, which essentially consists of a series of identities that
reflect the fact that what is a use for one sector, is also a source for another sector. This consistency
framework  reconciles  historical  data on income. expenditue. saving, investment  and financiai flows of
different sectors in the economy  (Holsen (19891.) In this paper we will concentrate  on the quasi-fiscal
deficit of the Central Bank. The methodology,  however,  may be applied to public financial  institutions
in general.
The flow-of-funds  approach  has two main advantages. First, it emphasizes  the macroeconomic
nature  of quasi-fiscal  deficits. To be able to assess  correctly  the impact  of quasi-fiscal  deficits,  the analyst
must specify precisely the linkages between the main economic agents. and treat the deficits as an
integrated  whole. The framework  will make  more transparent  the  link between  the quasi-fiscal  deficit  and
inflation  and the crowding-out  of the private sector.  Second, the methodology  implies full consistency
of treatment  of the deficits of the non-financial  public  sector  and the financial  institutions  being examined.
This is an important  requirement  for the proper consolidation.  and symmetry  of treatment,  of transactions
between  the government  and public  financial institutions. AdditionaUy,  the flow-of-funds  methodology
allows the possibility of obtaining estimates of some flows residually, such as Central Bank losses,
adjusted such that the other sectors are consistent within the macroeconomic  framework. The latter is
specially  important  for countries,  like most in Africa.  for which data is scarce.
Throughout  the paper,  we test our methodology  with data collected  for Madagascar. We examine
the historical  period  from 1986  to 1991. During  this period.  the Central  Bank incunred  considerable  losses.
We show that the public sector deficit is  significantly undervalued if  quasi-fiscal deficits are not
considered. For  the Malagasy  economy,  any reaionship between  fiscal deficit.  credit to the private sector
and inflation  must take into account  the results of the Centrl  Bank. The case of Madagascar.  however,
is not different from most African  countries,  where the tremendous  pressure on the govemments  to cut
2fiscal  deficits  while maintaining  non-viable  public  enterprises.  for political  and social reasons,  often results
in the accunulation of the less-visible  quasi-fiscal  deficits. Conventional  deficit  measures  most likely will
underestimate  the fiscal deficit.  and therefore  result in an erroneous assessment  of its sustainability.
The paper is organized  into six sections, including  the present introduction. In the next section
we revise  conceptual  aspects  of QFDs. Here. we examine  in some detail the main theoretical  and practical
issues that make the computation  of quasi-fiscal  deficits difficult. In section Three we examine briefly
the economic  environment  of Madagascar. In section  Four. we develop an analytical  framework,  based
on the flow-of-funds  approach.  within which we may examine the impact  of quasi-fiscal activities. In
section Five, we use the framework  to estimate  the size of the quasi-fiscal  deficits for the period 1986  to
1991. We then "correct"  the fiscal deficit  by taking into account the quasi-fiscal deficit. In section Six,
we establish  our conclusions.
II. What are Quasi-Fiscal Deficits?: Main Conceptual Issues
In a broad sense. quasi-fiscal  deficits (QFDs)  are expenses or losses incurred  by pdblic financial
institutions. They reflect a subordination  of these institutions--in  particular of the Central Bank--to  the
ministry  of finance. Quasi-fiscal  activities  are diverse:  they  include the management  of explicit  or implicit
subsidies,  transfers to public non-financial  or financial institutions outside the central government,  the
provision of preferential credit. the bailout of ailing industries.  etc.  QFDs gmw at times of domestic
financial and extemal payment crises due to support to distressed financial institutions and domestic
debtors burdened by extemal liabilities denominated in extemal currencies.  Indeed, they can reach
massive prportions  during years of fiancial  and extemal crises in countries with weak financial
institutions.  QFDs of the Central Bank amounted to a cumulative 55 % of GDP during 1982-85  in
Argentina,  and to 41 % of GDP during the same period in Chile (Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel  (19911.)
It has frequently  been argued  that quasi-fiscal  operations  are similar to other budgetary  activities
and should be included in a comprehensive  measure of the public sector balance (Blejer and Cheasty
[19911.) Regularly, institutions  such as the Central Bank undertake activities such as the provision of
subsidized  credit to particular  sectors. In many countries  these activities  may be undertaken  directly  by
the agencies in the central govenmment.  We agree with Robinson and Stella (19881  that "it may be
difficult to see why an activity  administered  by the Central Bank may be different  in an economic  sense
from one administered  by other government  agencies. and therefore. why, if the latter are in a measure
of the central govemment  deficit,  the latter should be excluded." Certainly,  the experience  of the Latin
American  countries  illustrate  how misleading  public sector deficits can be if not corrected  for QFDs.
A key "working  assumption"  in the computation  of QFDs is that the Central  Bank as well as other
public  financial  institutions  should  be financially  sound.  and that--in the absence  of quasi-fiscal  activities-
should  not incur losses  on their core operations. For example,  the Central Bank will have access to zero
cost fnancing (monetary  base),  and financing  below  market rates (unremunerated  deposits  of commercial
banks), while being able to invest these funds at market rates.  Moreover,  profits may originate from
financial  investments  directly  financed  bv the liquid  net worth  of the Central Bank. Thus,  under "normal"
conditions,  the Central Bank should  report profits or at least zero losses.
This assumption  has motivated  researchers  to "amalgamate"  Cental Bank losses with the fiscal
deficit. as the more practical  way to capture the QFD. For example,  Robinson  and Steila [19881  propose
3that (i) Central Bank operational  losses be incorporated  into the public sector deficit by the addition of
a transfer from govenmment  to the Central Bank. financed by credit from the Central Bank. and (ii) an
estimate  of the size of Central  Bank  quasi-fiscal  activities  falling  outside  the profit-and-loss  account should
be made, and then amalgamated  into the adjusted fiscal deficit.  As it is stated in Blejer and Cheasty
[1991.p.16631,  this definition "would mix net worth with cash concepts, but would have value as a
supplementary  indicator showing  the approximate  impact of Central Bank quasi-fiscal activities on the
overaU  public sector balance.' According  to Robinson  and Stella. Central Bank losses  should be included
in the fiscal deficit, whether  or not they arise from QF activities. Their argument is based on an existing
asymmetry. Frequently, the Central Bank transfers all of its profits to the government  as excess fiscal
earnings. In this case. the fiscai  deficit will already reflect  the impact  of QF activities. However,  current
losses do not elicit a transfer from tie government  to cover the losses, so the measured  deficit does not
rise.
While the consolidation  of the Central Bank and fiscal deficits may be the more practical
approach.  it is essential to identify  all the revenues  and expenditures  arising  from QF activities. Isolating
these activities in the accounts  of public financial  institutions  would make their costs more transparent.
thus aiding scrutiny by the authorities. This transparency  is essential for the design of sound policy
prescriptions  Even if the public financial institution  is making a profit, leaving such activities in the
accounts will understate the gross level or revenues  and expenditures.  frequently taken as a proxy for
govenmuent  intermediation  in the economy.
One practical problem,  however, is the precise identification  of "normal".  as opposed to "quasi-
fiscal" activities. For example,  the "normal" monetary  activities of the Central Bank include currency
issue, banking regulation and supervision, the aggregate conaol of credit. the clearance of balances
between  banks.  and custody of the govenmment  reserves. If the Central  Bank is used  to bailout  commercial
banks and/or enterprises  (public  and/or  private) experiencing  fmiancial  difficulties,  this is clearly a quasi-
fiscal activity.  Ideally, then, govemment accounts should incorporate all quasi-fiscal revenues and
expenditures,  leaving Centrl  Bank accounts  covering  only "normal"  monetary activities.
Nevertheless,  clear distinctions  may be difficult. For example,  direct government  credit and bond
rediscounting,  geierally considered  monetary  activities,  will take on a quasi-fiscal  dimension  if performed
at subsidized  rates. Central Banks  usually provide  exchange  rate guarantees  as a way to facilitate  fortign
borrowing  by domestic residents. If a premium  is charged.  the Central Bank may make a profit in return
for reducing  the insured's risk. If, however, the Centra Bank is forced to assume the extemal transfer
portion of private sector debt, even when it was not guaranteed  by the govemment,  the resulting losses
are of a QF naure.  Different  accounting  conventions  between  the govenmment  and the Central Bank n'ay
also  complicate  the identification  of the "real"  QFD. Usually,  the conventional  govemment  deficit  is based
on a cash-accounting  systemq.  Central  Bank accounting  systems. on the other hand, typicaUy  follow the
normal business  practice  UL  being  on an accrual  basis. Inflation  may be another  major source  of distortion
in the computation  of the QFD (see Teijeiro (19891,  and Rocha and Saldanha  (1992].)
So far. most country  studies  of QFDs have relied on the "orthodox"  criteria to compute  the QFD.
For example.  in Onandi and Viana  (19871,  and Velazquez  [1991], an operation  of the Central  Bank is of
a QF nature  if it is not related  with the classical  or "orthodox"  functions  of the Central Bank. Onandi and
Viana (19881  examine the impact of quasi-fiscal activities in Uruguay.  According to these authors,
"Traditionally,  a series of Central  Bank operations  are performed  outside of the govenmment  budget,  but
their fiscal impact can not be ignored. Thus, we understand  an cperation  of the Central Bank to be of a
quasi-fiscal  nature if it is not related  to the classical  (orthodox)  functions  of the Central Bank" (authors'
4translation.) According  to Velazquez  ( 19911.  ".. the eamings or losses incunred  as a consequence  of non-
monetary activities of the Central Bank, should be coffectly incorporated in the measure of the fiscal
deficit" (authors' translation.) Clearly, this approach  discriminates  against "purely monetary" activities
performed  at subsidized  rates. Furthermore.  precisely  what Central  Bank activities may be considered  as
"orthodox"  is still a controversial  issue (nevertheless,  see de Kock [19741  for a list of activities generaly
considered  to be properly within  jurisdiction  of the Central Bank.)
Another  approach  is followed  in Piekarz (19871,  wihere  a more general framework  is provided  to
examine  the issue of QFDs from the Argentine  perspective. He argues that QFDs should be defined Is
the difference  between  the earnings  and expenditures  not considered  in the fiscal defic:t. This is basically
the difference  between income from net foreign and domestic assets. and net expenditures  on interest
payments, and/or other adjustments  resulting from the instruments used in the control of monetary
expansion.  Piekarz excludes instruments like unmemunerated  reserve requirements and open market
operations  with govemment  securides. In the case of the latter,  he argues that they properly  belong  to the
Treasury, not the  Central Bank, computing their interest payments as  public expenditure in  the
conventional  fiscal deficit  definition  of the non-financial  public  sector. In the case of the fonmer,  they are
rigorously part of the inflationary  tax and/or seigniorage. More recently, Giorgio [19911  applied the
Piekarz approach  to examine  QFDs in Argentina  for the period 1977-89.
It is our view that any effort to provide  a generic definition  of the QFD will inevitably  be partial
and incomplete. Quasi-fiscal  activities  vary from country  to country,  and have an effect in both the profit-
and-loss  and balance sheet  accounts,  making almost impossible  to assess their impact  through one sinble
deficit  measure. The situation  is further  complicated  in practice by the differing accounting  systems  used
in the government  and other public financial institutions. Still, in most cases the QFD can be traced to
"clear-cut"  QF activities, such as subsidized lending and bailout of commercial  enterprises. In a few
instances,  the distinction  between  "normal"  and QF activities may be subjective  A useful criteria is to
include  all activities  that may  be undertaken  direcdy  by central  government  agencies. In this way,  the cost
of quasi-fiscal activities may be taken as a proxy for the level of govemment internediation in the
economy. It is also important  to provide  reference  levels. above  or below which a "normal"  activity  will
become a quasi-fiscal  activity.  NormaUy,  these will arise from targeted private sector or government
lending operations  from the Central Bank. A convenient  benchmark  is to use the cost of net lending as
the sum that would have to be paid to a private commercial  bank to undertake the lending itselfWj.
Govemment accounts should then incorporate revenues and expenditures of all quasi-fiscal
activities,  leaving  the accounts  of public financial  institutions  covering  only their "normal"  activities. This
should  make  more transparent  the accountability  of the govemment. Here, we follow  Robinson  and Stella
[19881  by adjusting  ex-post the fiscal deficit by the addition of a transfer from the govemment  to the
Central  Bank--to  cover the cost of QF activities-financed  by credit from the Central Bank. As we shall
see, this has the advantage  of estimating  explicitly  the cost of QF activities in terms of "crowding-out"
of the private  sector.
To summarize,  there is currently a lack of genera agreement  as to what is the best methodology
to identify and compute the QFD. at least one that may be applied across countries and institutions. A
1 So far. however.  there  is not a genemlly  accepted  objective  metbod  for eshitg  the subsidy  value in official  direct lending  prhgns.  nainly
because  the difficulty  of prcisely establishing  the privae  utes  tast would  have  ben paid  by borowen in private  market  without  govemment
intervention  (see eg. Wattlewonh  (19881.)
5single  definition,  no matter how comprehensive,  wil not capture  the complex and country  specific nature
of the relationships  between  the centra goverment and other  public institutions  that give  rise to the QFD.
Still. given  the potential  prctical relevance  of the QFD for the whole economy, it is necessary  to develop
a general framework within which one may examine its macroeconomic implications.  In this section we
provided  genera guidelines  that wiU be usefu when we try to estimate the QFD for Madagascar.
IIL  The Case of Madagascar
General Background
The recent economic  history of Madagascar  is, to a large extent, representative  of a number of
African  countries. In the 1970s.  Madagascar  moved  from a relatively  open economy  to a tightly regulated,
command economy. The role of the public sector greatly increased. following the nationalization  of
foreign-owned  assets and the introduction  of pervasive economic controls.  Import substitution and
industrialization  became centra objectives,  with agriculture  relegated to a supporting role.  In the late
1979s  this strategy culminated in an ambidous public investment  program cominosed  of large, capital-
intensive and economically  non-viable  projects.  As a result, many new public enterprises generatng
negative value-added were created.  To  fmance this  strategy, the extenal  deut burden increased
significantly,  constraining economic gmwth of the country to  this day.  Mhis policy- together with
declining  terms of trade and stagpant revenues.  led to a widening  of extemal and intemal disequilibruia,
high inflation,  and a contraction  un  real GDP of 11 percent between 1980  and 1982.
In 1982-85.  the Govenmment  carried out a genemally  successful stabilization  prgram  with EMF
support.  The program succeeded in halting the economic decline, and GDP grew by 1.4 percent on
average between  1983  and 1987. On the extemal side, while  exports declined  in nominal dollar terms  and
interest payments soared, there was a major comraction  in imports. which dropped by more than 40
percent in real terms during the firut  half of the l980s.  These developments,  together with increasing
extemal aid flows. helped improve significantly Madagascar's balance of payments.  In paallel,  the
Government  implemented  a program of fiscal austerity. Fiscal deficit was reduced from its peak 14
percent  of GDP  in 1980  to 3.5 percent  in 1985,  through  a drastic  reduction  of public  expenditures. During
the second part of the decade. the authorities  consolidated  this substntial fiscal adjustment  effort and
fiscal deficit was kept within  a 3-4 percent range of GDP.
Economic  recovery,  however,  was  hampered  by structur  constrains. Among  the most import
were an overvalued  currency,  widespread  quantitative  import  restrictions  and price controls.  a bloated and
inefficient  parastatal sector, a badly deteriorated  and obsolete infrastucture, poor public services, and
pervasive  govenmment  interference  in viually  all aspects  of economic  life.
To address  these structua  constraints,  the Govemment  launched  a structural  adjustment  program
in the second  half of the 1980s. Most  price controls  were removed  in 1985-89.  and the public investment
program was progressively  rationalized. With regads to foreign  exchange and tade  libeialization,  the
Govenmment  devalued the Malagasy  Franc (FMG) by a cumulative  53 percent in trade-weighted  foreign
currency  terms in 1987,  and in 1988  the FMG was futher depreciated  by a total 14 percent. As a result,
by 1989 the real effective  exchange  rate had fallen to about 40 percent of its 1982  level.  This major
6Table I
Madagascar: Selected Indicators
(Annual Percentage Change, 1986-1991)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
National  Accounts
GDP Market  Prices  2.0  1.2  3.4  4.1  3.1  -6.9
GDP Deflator  14.2  23.0  21.2  12.0  11.5  14.1
Private Consumption  -2.6  -3.3  -1.8  1.2  4.1  -2.1
Govenmment  Constunption  -7.1  5.6  -9.9  8.1  -7.0  -6.7
Total Investment  7.8  16.6  33.9  4.8  28.0  -53.0
Exports of G&NFS  0.3  18.2  -0.6  24.0  11.1  -4.2
Imports  of G&NFS  -6.0  -1.4  -10.3  6.2  26.3  -22.1
Foreign  Sector
Terms of Trade (deterioration  -)  15.7  -22.1  -9.1  -12.0  -24.0  -5.8
Devaluation  Effective Exchange  10.9  34.3  23.5  -1.5  -13.5  10.0
Rate (FMG/US$)
Total Foreign Debt (% of GDP)  82.2  121.2  118.8  116.1  99.6  117.2
Debt Service Ratiol]/  31.6  37.9  49.0  53.1  42.1  68.0
of which Govenmment  28.0  27.4  29.6  16.1  17.7  18.1
Foreign Reserves  2.8  3.8  4.9  5.2  1.4  1.6
(months  of imports)
i/ After debt reshebduling  and write-offs.  as a proportion of exports  of goods and services.
exchange  rate adjustment  enabled  the  Govenmment  to eliminate  quantitative  restrictions  on imports  in 1988,
to launch  a four-year  program  of tariff reform,  and to introduce  an automatic  allocation  system  of foreign
exchange for merchandise  imports thrugh  an Open General Licensing system.  In addition, export
restrictions were substantially  reduced, all state agricultural monopolies were eliminated (except for
vanilla), and export taxes were abolished on all but the three traditional products (i.e.. coffee, cloves.
vanilla).
In the financial sector,  where  all banks were state-owned  and were experiencing  severe financial
problems as well as weak and wowening portfolios,  the Government  also undertook a major reform.
Specifically,  by end-1989 the portfolios  of the three state-owned  banks had been cleaned-up  of most of
non-performing  and of most doubtful  assets.  In 1980, a fully private new bank with majority foreign
capital started operations  and, in eady 1991.  one of the three state-owned  bank was privatized, while a
second obtained  minority private  participation.  and two private foreign banks  opened representations. In
1990. to encourage  fuither competition  in the financial  sector, the Central Bank began replacing  direct
quantitative control mechanisms with a  more flexible system based on the use of indirect market
instnments.
Overall. despite slower  than expected  progress in "process-oriented"  policy improvements  (i.e.,
budgetary,  civil service and public enterprise reforms), the cumulative implementation  of sectoral and
macroeconomic  reforms implemented  since 1985  was far reaching,  and the difference  between  the policy
7landscape  in 1985 and that prevailing  in 1991 was striling.  Beginning  in 1988, economic  results were
encouraging  (see Table 1.) The country  experienced  posidve per capita-albeit modest--GDP  growth in
three consecutive  years (1988-90)  for the first time in a generation.  with tangible evidence  of increased
private investment.  especially  in labor-intensive.  export-oriented  ventures.
Financial Sustainability of the Economic Recovery
Notwithstanding  the encouraging  results of 1988-90,  the supply response to the structural reform
program  implemented  since 1985  has not reached its potential and may not be sustainable.  In addition to
major physical  (infrastucture) bottlenecks.  the inadequacy  of the regulatory  and legal framework  to a well-
functioning  maricet  economy,  and declining  terms of trade. the private sector-led economic  recovery in
Madagascar  is severely constrained  by lack of credit and the heavy debt burden of the country. The latter
two constraints  are two sides of the same coin and are both reflected in the country's precarious public
finance.
Despite  the above-mentioned  success in reducing  the central government's  fiscal deficit,  the latter
is increasingly  misleading to assess the public sector need of financial resources. and therefore. the
financial  resources  available  for the private  sector. In paraUel  with the rcduction  of the central  government
deficit,  the Centrl  Bank (CB) has generated  increasing "net other items" reflecting  increasing  losses in
the 1980s. These  losses can be principally  traced as a result  of the transfer  to the CB of the responsibility
for servicing  the country's rescheduled  extemal debL Furthermore,  these losses were not compensated
by transfers nor interest payments from the govemment  to the CB.  The govenmment  has been using
subsidized  credit from the CB to finance its deficit. Untir 1991,  advances 2 from the CB to the treasury
were virtually  interest free (0.5 percent)  until 1991. On the other hand, treasury's  deposits at the CB were
not remunerated. lhe evolution  of the size of the net subsidy  from the CB to the treasury  was therefore
determined  by the evolution of CB net credit to govemmenL As it is shown in Table 2, the implicit
interest rates paid by the govemment  on its net domestic  debt are well below commercial  interest rates,
which have fluctuated  between 15 and 25 percent per year.
The increase in the implicit interest rate paid by the govemment  to the CB in 1989 and 1990
reflected  simply  the substantial  reduction  in the CB's net credit to government  (from 17 percent of GDP
in  1986 to 5 percent in  1990).  In tum, this reduction reflected essentially (i) the low govenmment
payments  of extemal debt matLuities  (see below) together  with (ii) the accumulation  of counterpart  funds
of extemal aid flows.  Conversely,  in 1991, net credit to govenmment  increased. The increase of the
implicit interest  rate paid by the govemment  to the CB reflected  the decision of the Govenmment  in mid-
1991 to remunerate  treasury  deposits (to) and bormwing  (from) the Central Bank at money matiet rate.
2  Advances  from the CB to the treasury  are statutorily  limited  to a ceiling of 15 percent of ordinary budget  revenues  of the
previous  fiscal year and should be statutorily  reimbursed  widhin  six months  of the closing of fiscal  year in which these advances  are
made. In practice  however.  these  statutory  provisions  have been consistently  violated. The actual  ratio at the end of 1990,  for
example  was  about 290 permcnt  of ordinary  budget  revenues  of the previous  year: even net of government  deposits, the ratio of
advances  was 78 percent of the previous  year's ordinary  budgetary  receipts.
8Table 2
Average Interest Rates Paid on Domestic and Foreign Debt
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
Implicit  interest re  on net  2.0%  2.1%  2.6%  6.0%  7.0%  8.8%
CB credit to govenmnent
Average  Interest Rates on Foreign  Debt
Central Bank  6.8%  7.0%  7.1%  7.5%  6.3%  9.5%
Govenmment  5.0%  5.5%  3.9%  2.3%  2.2%  2.6%
In the mid-1980s, the CB losses baMlooned  as a result of previous arrangements  whereby the
responsibility  for servicing the rescheduled  external  debt was transferred  to the CB.  After seven Paris
Clubs and four London Clubs, in 1991  CB debt outstanding  represented 46 percent of total debt and 67
percent  of the country's debt service. The interposition  of the CB between  domestic debtors.  namely the
govemment  and public enterprises,  and foreign  creditors  has resulted in three types of losses for the CB:
(i)  As some intial debtors  (public enterprises)  defaulted,  the CB is stuck with a portfolio  of
irrecoverable  claims:
(ii)  While the original  debtors reimbursed  the Centrl  Bank in FMG according to the initial
contract, CB was committed  to service the debt on the basis of successive rescheduling
agreements  which, in lengthening  maturities,  were also increasing  the total burden  of the interests;
(iii) Subsequent  exchange  rate devaluations  gave rise to valuation losses in the books  of the CB.
The CB statutes were amended  at the time of the arrangements  to state explicitly that the
government would guarantee any resulting valuation losses.  When extemal liabilities are
amortized,  CB realizes  its accrued valuation  losses. However,  this guarantee  has so far been
ignored  and the losses have accrued in a valuation  account which the CB nLgards  as a claim on
government. As a "'rnsequence.  the "revaluation  account" records a mnix  of accrued and cash
results  fnxm  servicing  of extemal  debt (as well  as a number  of sundry  operations  and transactions).
As a rra'ilt of this extemal  debt  arrangement,  the govemrnment  has significantly  reduced  its extenal
debt service  (and therefore its need of domestic financing)  at the expense  of the CB. By 1991,  the long-
tenn foreign  liabilities  of the CB (i.e.. the country's rescheduled  external debt) represented 180 % of its
total assets (see Table 5).  Clearly, the past and future losses generated  by such an agreement  should be
viewed as part of the cost of a debt rescheduling  and, therefore, should be part of a deficit measure,
especially if the direct impact on  the government's deficit was to  reduce debt service payments.
Furthennore.  as sOjwn in Table 2, while the government  paid an average 2.9 percent interest in 1991  on
its foreign  debt. the CB paid 9.5 percent  This reflects  the fact that after shifting the rescheduled  part of
the extemal debt to the CB, the govenmment  was left with essentiaUy  the more concessional (non-
reschedulable)  part of the debt
9Although  the source of the CB losses have been identifed. the full extent of the QFD cannot be
readily  assessed  from the financial  data available  (i.e.. the  CB balance  sheet and income  stazement).  Since
corrections  for QF activities are done retroactively,  we must take into account accumulated  debt service
payments from debt rescheduling  agreernents  and subsidized  credit dating back to 1986.  Also, when
computing  the CB losses.  it is imporant to clarify the accounting  practice  regardng the valuatik.n  account
(see above).
IV. Analytical Framework
In order to  examine the issues presented In this paper, wG require the aid of schematic
representations  of the budget and balance sheet of the CB. and the govenment accounts. The need,
however, of an economy-wide  analytical  framework  is readiy apparent. To a great extent. the QFD of
the Central  Bank reflects the level of "financial  repression."  and the distortions  generated  in the Malagasy
economy  due to heavy govemment  intervention  in the investment  and saving process.  The main sectors
examined are then the central government.  Private Sector, Central Bank. commercial banks, and the
balance of payments.
The budget  constraints  for all sectors may be represented  in a matrix foiaZ.  commonly  referred
to as the flow-of-funds  matrix (See eg. Holsen (19891.) Table 3 shows flow-of-funds  matrices for
Madagascar  for the year 1991,  both for the current and capital accounts. This table will be the basis of
our discussion  in the next pages.  The overarching  concept is that each sector in the framework  must
satisfy the following  budget  constraint:
Sources of Funds = Uses of Funds
Sources = Current Income + Accumulation  of Liabilities
Uses = Current Expenditures + Aceumulation of Assets
An important  distinction  is made between the current account and the capital account. The link
between  the current and capital account  is each sector's saving. Generly,  saving will be defined as the
cunrent  account excess of sources  over uses of funds above the line in each sector.  In the case of the
Central  Bank and Private  Banks,  the  current accounts  would  normally  be identfied with the profit-and-loss
statements,  and the capital accounts  with the balance  sheet. Cunenu savings is then identified with the
changes in net worth.
For each of the sectors, the row and column represents  the expendire  and income breakdowns
respectively.  The balancing  item for each sector's curent account  is saving, shown in he lower left-hand
comer of the matrix. The equality  of the capital account  row and column says that the sum of their total
uses of financing is equivalent  to the total of their sources of finmcing, with the latter including  own
saving. To put it another way, the excess of investment  over saving is equal to the net bonowing from
domestic and extemal sources for each sector.
10Table  3. Madagascar: 1991 Matrix of Sources  and Uses of Funds (Billion  FMG)
Current  CreDal  Private  CenI  ComtewiaI  Balabn  of  Productwn
Account  Govrngint  sfec,tor  Bak  Bank  Payments  Account  TotAL
Central  TD  64.51  Ecb  0.01  7;f  0.01 77  29641  455.51
Government  .,7R  56.51  COo  38.21  -Sub  0.0
,.  ~  ~I  i  ' 
Private  TJp  64.91  1  OPCeb  16.11 OPCb  0.0 jTp  116.0j  GMf  4561.6  488L.91
Sector  |DDO  0.01  WR  0.0j
iT'TDp  0.0 i PRfp  123J I
Central  ;iCCRcb  ;4.81  iL'L.Vcb  4.9  iL'LNb  0.0i  iRESm  7.5  47.2i
Bank
Commercial  iCCRb  8.91 iC'LNb  1031  i
Balance  iFFg  55.71  iFFp  7.1 iiFFeb  '020|1  IhMt  116R3  606
of  Tgf  0.01  PRpf  3.51  -Xt  8492
payments  Tpf  0.0O
I  C h S  51901cp  4t327  ;
'Account  Sg  l.  I  Sp  188.41 Seb  -189I  Sb  1132  Sf  321.6
Total  455.8  488L.  47.21  11.32  6.6j  57I3
Capitai  Central  Piivate  CeotraI  Cotmenal  BHahne  of  Production
Account  Government  sector  Bant  Banb  Pawmenta  Aecount  Jotal
Ceontral  dHgp  9.3  dCReb  -5.3j  dCRb  -35.2  dfg  190.7 Sg  1.1  213J
. Govetnment  KOG  525
Private  iKT;p  28.01  dLNcb  1.0  dLNb  1002 1dFp  34.6  Sp  188.  377SB
Sector  ' DMI  2.' 
077-F  0.0
ICntral  dDEPeb  -105.81  dCU  7Z.5  dRR  93.1  dlm  83.21 Scb  -18Qt  -46.81
Commecial  dDEPb  14.71 dDD  1065  dLNb  -433  dFb  -12.1  Sb  1132  20001
. BFob  |  * ~~~  ~~~drD  31.0 
. Balbnce  dRESm  0.8  dDEPf  41.6  Sf  321.  364.1
;Payments:|
l  chto  !gt  J32 Acceunat  ~  I762  ~pl  *  f _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
. Total  731  !  _-4.8|  00.0j  3$10  4352
11Table 4
Government Accounts
(as a Percentage of GDP)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
Total Revenue  12.7  15.4  13.8  15.4  16.2  10.5
Tax Reveiue  11.8  14.1  12.5  10.2  10.3  7.4
Non-Tax Revenue  0.2  0.6  0.6  1.7  1.5  1.2
Foreign Grants  0.7  0.7  0.7  3.5  4.4  1.9
Total Expenditure  16.0  18.9  17.3  19.5  17.1  15.8
Consumption  7.7  7.5  6.8  6.9  6.2  6.0
Investment  5.4  7.0  6.9  9.7  7.9  5.7
Interest  Payments  1.6  2.1  2.1  1.6  1.5  2.0
Domestic  Debt  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.5  0.5  0.9
Foreign Debt  1.2  1.7  1.8  1.1  1.0  1.1
Other Expenditure  1.3  2.3  1.5  1.3  1.5  2.1
Govenmuent  Deficit  -3.3  -3.5  -3.5  -4.1  -0.9  -5.3
Govenmuent  Financing  3.3  3.5  3.5  4.1  0.9  5.3
Net Extemal Borwwing  2.3  3.7  3.9  4.6  2.1  3.9
Drawings  4.6  6.6  7.2  6.6  4.1  6.0
Amortization  -2.3  -2.9  -3.2  -1.9  -1.9  -2.0
Net Domestic  Credit  0.8  -0.4  -0.6  -0.7  -1.2  1.2
Non-Bank  Financing  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.2
We will only describe  in detail the budget  con.traints for the central  govemment  and the Central
Bank. The algebraic  representation  of the budget  constraints  for aU  sectors is presented  in the Appenchx,
together with a description  of the variables  used.
1.  The Central Government
Under this heading, we wiU  include only the fisa  authorities. Ideally, we would include the
complete  non-fuiancial  public sector. That is. aU  public sector except for the Central Bank and publicly-
owned financial  institutions. However,  the lack of information  in the case of Madagascar  wil  not allow
us to use this concept.  The rest of the non-financial  public sector wiU  automaticaUy  be included in the
private sector, which is calculated  as the residual.
12The cunrent  account of the central govenument  can be described as follows:
DT  + T/  + NR  + Ed,  + ECOG  - SUB  (
Tl+  icCRl+  i.E-F.-F  + P  C  + Sg
Equation (1) defines the savings of the central govemnment  (S.) as the sum of direct (Dl)  and
indirect  (TI)  taxes,  non-tax  revenue  (NTR),  current  official  grants  (E-COG). minus subsidi.  s (SUB).  pivate
transfers (Tp), interest payments  on Central Bank credit (ic-CR,b.1),  interest on commercial  bank credit
(ic'CR  ,q), interest payments  on foreign  debt (E.F.,),  and govemment  consumption  (pc  Cg).
If the Central Bank reports profits. part of this may be transferred  to the govemment  as excess
fiscal earnings. If on the other  hand. the Central  Bank incurs  operating  losses, the govemment  may cover
part of this through a transfer. Net Central Bank current transfers are represented  by E¢, in Equation (1).
In the case of Madagascar,  there are no govenmment  transfers to cover Central Bank losses. hence ECh  is
equal to zero.
The capital account of the central govemment  is given by:
E-KOG  - CR,  + AB  + E.SF,S,  e=  p,-I  +KT  +D  EDa  P,  (2)
Equation (2) simply states that public investment  (p,*4),  capital transfers to the Private Sector
(XT~) and Central Bank deposits (ADEP,), are financed through capital grants from abmad (E-KOG),
govenmment  savings (S.) as well as non-bank financing  (AB.). net credit from CB (ACRb), coir'nercial
banks (ACR,),  and net foreip  (AF',) bonmwing.
In Table 3 we see that for 1991  the govenmment  collected  64.5 billion FMG in direct taxes, 296.6
billion of indirect taxes, and 56.5 billion in non-tax revenue.  Additionally,  it received 38.2 billion in
foreign  (current)  grants. The  government  paid the CB 43.7 billion as interest  to service its domestic  debt.
Goveniment current savings amount to only  1.1 billion.  In that period. total government borrowing
requirements  (net domestic  and external  borrowing),  excluding  capital grants. reached 265.3 billion  FMG
(including 105.8  billion FMG of govemmeM  withdrawals  frm  the Central Bank), or 5.3 % of GDP.
2.  The Central Bank
The Central Bank budget  holds for flows over any discrete period of time. For a Central Bank,
no less than for any other economic  unit. the difference between the flow of receipts and the flow of
expenditures  over some time period-that is, "saving",  or the current "budget  surplus".  or the "change  in
net worth"--is  necessarily  equal to the sum of changes  in assets less the sum of changes in liabilities.
In terms of the schematic  budget statement  and balance sheet:
13Table 5
Central Bank Balance Sheet
(End-of-Period Billion FMG)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
Total Assets  819.6  1113.9  1352.9  1512.6  1372.5  1354.3
Foreign Assets  88.1  236.7  340.9  380A  134.9  164.4
Govemment  Credit  701.4  839.1  974.7  1093.8  1088.9  1083.6
Private  Credit  29.9  32.7  26.6  26.6  21.2  22.2
(Public Enterprises)
Credit to Banks  0.2  5.4  10.7  11.8  127.5  84.1
Total Liabilities  819.6  1113.9  1352.9  1512.6  1372.5  1354.3
Monetary  Base  189.8  229.1  237.5  327.4  295.8  460.6
Goverunent Deposits  307.3  438.3  599.2  784.1  796.4  690.6
ST Foreign Liabilities  103.3  111.2  79.0  151.5  156.6  239.7
o/w IMF  53.8  47.7  13.2  25.4  -1.1  3.0
Foreign Arrears  63.1  100.8  86.8  43.6  0.0  241.3
LT Foreign  liab. (Debt  762.1  1550.0  1920.1  2053.7  2060.6  2436.6
Rescheduling)
Net Other Liabilities  -606.6  -1315.5  -1569.7  -1847.7  -1936.9  -2714.5
o/w Valuation  account  -405.6  -1058.7  -1286.3  -1413.1  -1489.6  -2087.2
Current Account
5cCRcb-,  LWcNb_  +  iL-N_j  W  + E-i;.-< l  = Ea  - E-i'-F;,  +  oPC  S  (3)
Capital Account
AF  + ACUU + ARR  + ADP  AV  + So
=  AR  + ACR6 + ALN  + ANb
Current  revenues of the Central Bank include interest receipts on its net domestic credit to the
govenmment  (ic-CRCbj,),  private and commercial  banks credit (iL-Nb.,  + i,-LN.d,),  and interest on foreign
reserves  (E-I.R*R,  the asterisk  denotes  foreign  currency). Its current revenues  finance the Central Bank's
operating  cost (OPCca).  interest payments  on the Central  Bank's foreign  debt (E ia-Pb), transfers to the
government  in the form  of profits  (Eb), and savings,  or net worth  (Sob).  The operating  costs (OPCCb),  also
include  net other assets (buildings,  real state. etc.). Notice  that the variations  in Centrl  Bank's net worth
14are identical  to the difference  between  the Central  Bank's revenues  and expenditures.  but excluding  capital
gains or iosses due to exchange  rate devaluations.
In the capital account. the net worth, along with the net issue on foreign debt (AF,b),  the net
increase in the monetary base (ACUp  + ARR currency  in circulation and reserve requirements).  capital
gains/losses  (AV.  the so called valuation  account),  and the deposit balance  of the govemment  (ADEP 8),
fmiance  the acquisition  of foreign  reserves (AR),  and domestic  credit creation (ACRg  + ALlV).  The term
AFCb, net disbursements,  include both short- and long-term net disbursements.  as well as changes in
arrears.  which we consider as a financing  item.
If we define the Central  Bank deficit as the negative  of the net worth. as defined  here. then there
is full consistency  of treatment  between  the deficit  of the Government  and the Central Bank losses. In
the case of the Government,  the public sector deficit was intended to measure the financing needs rather
than economic  results.  Consistency  was achieved  by adjusting the Central Bank's results for what is
necessary  to become a measure of financing needs.  As in the case of the Government.  amortization
payments  are included in net disbursements,  and hence excluded fronm  the deficit. even though they have
to be financed.
The Valuation Account  of the Central Bank
As in private-sector  budget  constraints.  valuations  effects (capital gains or losses)  are assumed  to
be treated appropriately. That is, either excluded from both exchanges in assets and liabilities  and the
surplus  of receipts  minus outlays  over the period.  or systernatically  included  in both. In standard  balance
sheet presentations.  valuation  accounts  are included,  as it is shown in Table 5.  However,  in the flow-of-
funds presentation  we have to limit ourselves  to realized incomes  and expenditures. The reason for this
is the very nature of the flow-of-funds  approach.  which requires  that somebody's income is somebody
else's expenditure. For example,  a devaluation  of the exchange rate results in an increase in long-tenm
foreign  liabilities,  denominated  in local currency,  but will not imply in an immediate  disbursement  from
the CB until the debt is serviced. Thus, while capital gains or losses are part of true income, they will
be reflected  only as they are realized.
It is useful to obtain an independent  estimate of the size of the valuation gains or losses.  In
principle,  the valuation  account  of the central bank should  capture only the accrued capital  gains or losses
arising  from converting  stocks  of assets  and liabilities  denominated  in a foreign  currency  to local currency.
Valuation  flows may be considered  either an asset or a liability, the sign of which will depend on the
value of net foreign assets. If the valuation  account  is considered  a liability, and if net foreign assets of
the central  bank are positive,  an exchange  rate depreciation  should generate  an increase in the domestic
currency  value of net foreign  assets,  and a matching  increase  in the valuation  account. Conversely,  if the
net foreign assets  are negative,  an exchange  rate devaluation  implies a decrease  in the valuation  account.
Thus, a devaluation  should not have an immediate  impact  on base money creation.
In the event of a devaluation,  there are two effects that have to be taken into account when
converting  from foreign  to local  currency  (we assume that  all foreign  assets and liabilities  are denominated
in the same currency,  hence we ignore cross-cunrency  effects.)  First, is the revaluation effect, which
occurs when stocks denominated  in a foreign currency are converted to local currency.  Clearly, a
devaluation  will increase  the domestic  value of the stock, even when its value in foreign  cufrency  remains
the same. Second,  is the timing effect  which results  from the fact that foreign  currency  denominated  stock
15are converted to  local currency values using end-of-period  exchange rates while the period average
exchange rates are used to convert  foreign currency flows  to domestic equivalents.
In the case of the CB of Madagascar.  as shown in Table 5. net foreign assets have been negative
throughout.  thus the valuation  account--considered  a liability--decreased  substantially  during the period.
However,  as we discussed in Section  III. the valuation  account mixes accrued with cash concepts, and
includes "other items", not necessarily  related with capital gains or losses. According  to our estimates.
only about 80 % of the valuation  account reflects losses arising from exchange rate devaluations. As a
result. part of the valuation account  may be monetized. 3
If E represents  the average  exchange  rate. then we may express the capital account  of the Central
Bank, net of capital gains or losses as:
EAF  +  ACUP +  AM+  ADERP -- AW  ()
= E*AR-  ACRo,  ALNb  + AWb
This expression will then replace  the budget  constraint  represented  by Eq. (4) above. Notice that
we have replaced  AFCs,  net disbursements  in local currency, by  E-Ac 3 (the asterisk denotes foreign
denominated  currency),  and AR.  change  in reserves  in local currency. by E-AR. Also, we have excluded
the valuation flows from the budget constraint of the Central Bank.  We now discuss how the actal
figures were computed for the CB of Madagascar  for the year 1991.
On the current revenue  side. the CB received  34.8 billion FMG from the govemnment  as interest
payments. This figure  is not directly  available.  but was computed  assuming  that the govenunent  paid the
same interest  on its bank and non-bank  debt. and that there is not a spread between  government  credit and
govemment  deposit interest rates. T1he  sum of government  interest payments  of 34.8 billion to the CB.
and 8.9 billion to commercial  banks. matches the 43.7 billion reported by the central government  as
interest payments  or, domestic debt.
As can be  seen in  Table 4,  interest payments on  govemment's domestic debt have been
traditionally  quite low. and have increased only in later years (see Section III above). The figure for
interest  on foreign  reserves.  7.5 billion. was taken directly  from the balance  of payments. From Table 3,
we see that interest on foreign debt reached 220.2 billion FMG in 1991. This figure was taken from
foreign  debt service payment  information  compiled  independently  by the CB. The figure of 7.1 billion.
which we repon as operating  cost. represents  items  like wages, real state and net other assets. This figure
was obtained residually, so that the difference between current revenues and expenditures match the
hiistorically  given operating loss of 189.1  billion FMG for 1991 (3.9 % of GDP).
As we can see in the capital account  matrix in Table 3. to finance net worth  loss and withdrawal
from government  deposits.  the monetary  base was  increased  by 164.9  billion  FMG.  or 3.4 percent  of GDP.
Net foreign  disbursements  amounted  to 74.2 billion. Amortization  of foreign  debt in 1991  reached 109A
3 Of course,  exchange  rate  losses  may also be eventually  monetized  through  net repayments  of foreign liabilities,  and  through
larger intermst  payments  on the stock of (negative)  net foreign  assets.
16million  SDR, or about 275 billion FMG. Most  of the foreign  financing.  however. is in the form of arrears.
In 1991.  foreign arrears of the Central Bank increased  by 241.3 billion FMG.
What we have done so far is just the manipulation  of current and capital accounting  identities.
However,  they pmvide useful insights  regarding  the sources  of monetary  expansion  in any given country.
Equation (5) states that the base money (ACUp  +  ARR)  expands not only when net foreign assets or
domestic  credits are expanded.  but also when the Central Bank runs an excess of interest payments plus
operating  costs over interest  revenues,  what we have defined as the changes  in the net worth (ASeb).  The
latter,  usually  disregarded  in monetarv  policy analysis.  is at the core of the monetary  disequilibrium  caused
by the quasi-fiscal  deficit.
V.  Estimating the QFD for Madagascar
In Section II we discussed  some of the activities  that may account for the losses of the Central
Bank. In general. the losses  originate  when the Central  Bank takes on other functions  besides its normal
role, such as subsidized  lending to priority sectors. rescue of troubled financial institutions.  or granting
foreign  exchange guarantees. In the case of Madagascar.  we have traced CB losses mainly to "quasi-
7iscal"  activities arising from debt rescheduling  agreements. As we discussed in Section III. the CB
adopted  responsibility  for servicing  the country's rescheduled  extemal debt. which is in effect a form of
exchange rate guarantee.
In addition, the govemment  obtained subsidized  lending from the CB. in principle  contributing
to increase  CB losses. Strictly speaking,  this is not a quasi-fiscal  deficit since this is usually the way in
which the CB transfers seigniorage  and inflationary  tax revenue to the government  Nevertheless,  if the
CB is incurring  losses, any interest  payment from the govenmment  may be used to reduce them. On the
other hand. if the CB bank is making a profit. all interest  payments are normally transferred  back to the
government  in the form of fiscal surplus (ECB  if we use our notation.) In any event, it is imporant to
increase transparency  by allowing  the govemment  to service its CB debt at market rates, and having
seigniorage  or other revenues  transferred  to the government  explicitly.
Unlike  most other  central  bank activities.  guarantees  have  no immediate  effect on either the profit-
and-loss account or the balance sheet.  Nevertheless,  and Madagascar is a  clear example. they may
eventually result in large losses.  As we have discussed. an exchange rate depreciation generates an
increase  or decrease  in the valuation  account.  with no immediate  effect  on base money  creation. However.
when a guaranteed  debt service  payment  is made, the value of its foreign assets falls by an amount equal
to the foreign  currency payment  multiplied  by the new exchange rate. As in the case of Madagascar.  if
this amount is greater than the money base used by the government or the private sector to purchase
foreign  exchange  from the CB. then the result is a reduction  of the net worth (increase of the deficit)  of
the Central Bank.
As we discussed in Section  II. the government  accounts should reflect the expenditures  of the
activities  described  above. We will  accomplish  this in two steps. First, we will adjust  government  foreign
and domestic  debt service  flows. Obviously,  this will  also affect CB accounts. Second. we will "finance"
the resulting  increase  in govemment  debt service with credit from the CB. The direct effect of this will
be an increase  in the PSBR (Public  Sector Borrowing  Requirements),  fnanced from CB credit.  Table 6
shows the results of these operations  for 1991. using the flow-of-funds  fornat.  Table 7 shows the
government  deficit "corrected"  by introducing  the QFD for the period 1986  to 1991.
17Table 6. Corrected 1991 Matrix of Sources and Uses of Funds (Billion FMG)
Current  Central  Private  Central  Commercial  Balance  of  Production
Account  oovernment  Sector  j3ank  Banks  Pavments  Account  Tota-
Central  TD  64.51  Ecb  80.51  T  0.01 77  296,61  536.31
Government  SiR  $6.51  COG  38.21  -Sub  00  1  |
Private  Tap  64.91  OPCcb  16.11 OPCb  0o0i  T(p  116.01  GDPfc  4561.61  488191
Sector  iD'DD  0.01  WR  0.01
iT'TDp  0.0 IPRfp  123.31
CentrA/  iC'CRcb  98.71 iL'LNVcb  4.91  iL 'LVb  001  iRESm  7 51  I.I 
ceta  ,.  RS
Bank
I  Commercil  iC'CRb  8.91  iC'LNb  104 31 
Banks
Balbace  iF'Fg  26141iF'Fp  ZlIiF'Fcb  14.51  IMLt  1169.3  606.61
of  Tgf  0.01  PRpf  3.5  1  1  _Xt  8492
Payments  Tpf  0.0°!  . |
C&  s  Cg  290.41  Cp  4452ZI  7  1  517631
Account  Sg  -18&0  Sp  188.41  &0.  1Sb  11321Sf  321.61
To  tal  5316.31  4881.91  iii.iJ  I
3.1
2 1  606.  5178.3
Capital  Central  Privste  Ceatral  Commercial  Balnoce  of  Production
Account  Government  sector  Bank  Banik  Pavments  Accounr  Total
[Central  tdB#p  9.31  dCRcb  395.71  dCRb  -35.2  dFg  -21.21$  -g  188.0  213.If
Government  |KOO  52.51I
Private  KTgp  28.01  dLNcb  1.0  dLNb  10021  dFp  34J61 Sp  1884  377.31
Sector  i  |DFI  25.11
IOTh'F  0.01
Central  dDEPeb  -10581  dCU  71.5  dRR  934  dFm  '95.1  i Scb  0.  35421
Bank  IIIII
Cenra  7.S  934..m  -0  52
Commercal  dDEPb  14.71 dDD  106.51  dLNb  -43.3  dFb  -221  Sb  1132  200.04 !Bani  bdD  31.0j
Balace  dRESm  0.8  dDEPt  41.61  |Sf  321.6  364.0
of  I 
Payments  ,  I
C&  S  is  g'762  1 Ip  15.9D  4  3S24
. Account  j  1  I3.
rTotal  '131  3771 ,  35421  '°°  364.01  4352  f
18Table 7
Government Accounts Corrected for QFD
(as a Percentage of GDP)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
Total Revenue  12.7  15.4  13.8  15.4  16.2  10.5
Total Expenditure  19.0  23.1  21.6  24.9  21.1  21.4
Consumption  7.7  7.5  6.8  6.9  6.2  6.0
Investment  5.4  7.0  6.9  9.7  7.9  5-7
Interest  Payments  4.6  6.3  6.4  7.0  5.6  7.6
Domestic  Debt  2.0  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.8  2.2
Foreign Debt  2.6  4.4  4.6  5.2  3.8  5.4
Other Expenditure  1.3  2.3  1.5  1.3  1.5  2.1
Govefmment  Deficit  -6.3  -7.7  -7.8  -9.5  -5.0  -10.9
Uncorrected  Deficit  -3.3  -3.5  -3.5  -4.1  -0.9  -5.3
Quasi-Fiscal  Deficit  -3.0  -4.2  -4.3  -5.4  -4.1  -5.6
CB Profit Earnings  0.6  0.0  1.4  1.3  0.7  1.6
Government  Financing  5.7  7.7  6.4  8.2  4.3  9.3
Net Extemal Borrowing  1.8  2.8  2.7  3.2  1.1  -0.4
Drawings  4.6  6.6  7.2  6.6  4.1  6.0
Amortization  -2.8  -3.8  -4.5  -3.3  -3.0  -6.4
Net LDomestic  Credit  3.7  4.6  3.5  4.8  3.2  9.5
Non-Bank  Financing  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.2
For practical reasons, we will assume that the central government will cover all debt service
obligations  arising from debt rescheduling  operations. As it is reported by the CB. total debt service is
basically  composed by debt rescheduling  repayments  and the rest, which includes IMF net purchases.
Since there is infonmation  available  for debt rescheduling  repayments.  the separation  was straightforward.
For example.  in 1991 the CB allocated  about 93% of its total interest payments.  and 77% of principal
repayments  to service  debt rescheduling  obligations. Thus, without  debt rescheduling  repayments,  the CB
would have paid only 14.5  billion FMG in interest, and 65.8 billion FMG in principal  in 1991.
Interest  payments  on CB debt. were increased  to 98.7 billion FMG in the government  accounts.
This reflects payments based on 12 % interest which reflects commercial  rates on old and "new" CB
credit.  Since we have made the corrections  starting from 1986. by 1991 the government  would had
accumulated  1.259.9  billion FMG  in net credit from the CB. After these ex-post corrections.  in 1991  the
CB pays only 14.5  billion in interest  paymnents  on its foreign  debt. and net govenument  borrowing  form
the CB increases  from a "formal"  level of -5.3 billion FMG (i.e.. net repayment  to the financial system)
19to a "reconstructed"  level of 395.7 billion FMG. The CB would then be making a profit of 80.5 biLlion
in 1991. We  assume, however.  that it is fully transferred  back  to the government  as excess fiscal earnings.
As we can see in Table 7. the government  deficit is basically  doubled in the period 1986-1991
if we add the QFD.  This does not change the overall macroeconomic  picture. it simply increases  the
transparency  of the public finance  accounts. thereby clarifying  the sources and uses of resources in the
economy.  However, by improving  the assessment of the public sector deficit, this exercise has far
reaching policy consequences  for the country's economic  policy.  In the particular case of Madagascar,
the assessment  of quasi fiscal  deficit  reveals  that the modest  "formal"  fiscal  deficit was  grossly  misleading.
It could  not be reconciled  with  continuing  inflationary  pressures  and tight credit policy  vis-a-vis the private
sector. It now squarely raises the question  of the sustainability  of the public sector deficit and therefore
the consistency  between the government's  development  strategy and its macroeconomic  policy.
The "reconstructed"  fiscal  deficit is not sustainable  in the long run and contradicts  the country's
development  strategy.  In a nutshell.  the high public sector deficit either crowds out the private sector
credit or will translate into inflation. Both will defeat the development strategy that is based on the
development  of the private sector  and exports. In consequence.  the country  must intensify  its fiscal effort.
This calls for reducing the fiscal deficit.  However,  as we have seen in Section III. after the real fiscal
effort on the expenditure side that took place during the early 1980s, and the high needs of public
expenditures in the area of infrastructure  and social services. the room of manoeuvre as well as the
desirability of further cuts in aggregate expenditure  is extremely limited.  Instead of further overall
expenditure  cuts, an energetic pursuit of the on-going public expenditure  restructuring, and increased
efficiency  of public management  should be pursued.
The fiscal effort is therefore  to be bome primarily  on the revenue  side.  Additional  tax revenues
could amount  to several  points of GDP if tax evasion  was lower. In tum, this calls for decreasing  the tax
rates, eliminating  exemptions  and improving  the tax yield by strengthening  the tax administration. Also
on the revenue  side. one of the reportedly  major source of revenue shortfall  is that public enterprises  do
not pay their debt to the goverunenL It is urgent to aggressively  pursue the privatization/liquidation  of
public enterprises to stop the drain on public resources and, in a limited number of cases. to bring
additional  revenues  to the budget.
In parallel  with a stronger  fiscal effort. the debt service burden should  be alleviated  through  more
favorable  rescheduling  terms. Most  of the QFD comes  from exchange rate losses. Although  a tightened
fiscal management  could reduce the fiscal deficit, an overly tight macroeconomic  policy to enable the
country  to service  its debt may be self-defeating. This poses the familiar  problem  of the sustainability  of
the country's debt service and its consistency  with the country's development  strategy. In a context of
sharp declining  terms of trade due to the prolonged  decline in the prices of its major exports. the service
of the external  debt is unsustainable  without additional  inflows  of balance of payment support or more
favorable  terms of rescheduling.
Due  to its rapidly  declining  traditional  exports.  Madagascar  is caught  into a vicious  cycle that will
be difficult  to break. On the one hand, to be able to service its debt, Madagascar  urgently needs more
export revenues through the development  of new products. which imply maintaining a competitive
exchange  rate  and more investment  in key sectors. In tum the latter implies  a more favorable  environment
for the development  of the private  sector,  including  credit availability. On the other hand.  the debt service
burden  increases  the public sector's needs of resources,  which crowds out the private sector and increases
the government's reluctance  to devalue.
20VI.  Conclusions
The stance adopted throughout  this paper has been decisively  operationally-oriented.  It provides
a straightforward  methodology  to better assess the importance of public sector activities not directly
captured in conventional deficit measures.  Our approach implies the identification  of quasi-fiscal. as
opposed to "normal"  operations.  of public financial  institutions. Although  clear-cut distinctions  may be
difficult, it is nonetheless  important  to identify activities that may be directly undertaken by the central
government,  and that are in principle  behind  the losses  of financial  intermediaries. Often, the quasi-fiscal
losses can be traced, as in the case of Madagascar.  to exchange rate guarantees and subsidized  credit
Hence,  the  most important  telltale  signs  of a potentially  large  QFD are decreasing  govemment  debt service
payments  vis-a-vis the rest of the economy, and subsidized  Central Bank credit either to the govenmment
or to the private sector.
For a govenmment,  showing  a strong "formal"  fiscal  adjustment  has the advantage,  in the short-rn.
of strengthening  the confidence  of both the intemational  donors  and the local private sector  in the capacity
of the govemment  to control the public deficit. In the longer run. however, governments  run the risk of
getting addicted to  this sort of  fiscal drug and to  "forget" the very  existence of  the quasi-fiscal
expenditures  that are left to the Central Bank to deal with.
Estimation  of the quasi-fiscal  deficit is crucial to improve  the country's economic  analysis and
projections.  The quantification  of quasi-fiscal deficits solves the apparent paradox between a small
"formal"  deficit  and crowding  out of the private sector  and/or  inflationary  pressures. As illustrated  by the
example  of Madagascar.  accounting  for these qua&i-fiscal  operations  significantly  changes  the picture of
fiscal performance and monetary stability and raises a  number of key  issues with regard to  the
sustainability  of the economic  recovery. From a fiscal standpoint. by obscuring the full magnitude  of
public sector financing  needs, the importance  of these activities  cannot be properly weighted  against that
of other activities  competing  for limited  resources. From a monetary  stand point,  quasi-fiscal  deficits  may
seriously interfere with monetary policy.  The Central Bank. in its reserve money management  has to
compensate  for the autonomous  increase of reserve money due to losses resulting from quasi-fiscal
operations  or accept the inflationary  consequences.
The cost spent in computing the QFD may be more than rewarded in tenms of the policy
implications. We have seen that in the case of Madagascar,  the difference  between the "reconstructed"
fiscal deficit is inconsistent  with the government  development  strategy. In policy terms. a reform of the
tax system with a view to increase  tax collection  is warranted.  the ongoing public enterprise  reform  ought
to be accelerated  and the restructuring  of expenditure  should be pursued energetically. Also, by placing
the external  debt service constraint  into a fiscal perspective,  it clearly shows, in fiscal terms.  that the debt
service burden is too high to be reconciled  with a sustainable  positive per capita growth.  especially in a
context of falling terms of trade.
On the institutional  front.  the policy implication  is to strengthen  the financial  independence  of the
Central Bank. In many countries such as  Madagascar. this is  ensured de jure  by the articles of
incorporation  of the Central Bank, but disregarded  in practice. Enforcement  of this practice  should rank
high in the list of measures included  in the adjustment  programs  supported by the IMF and the World
Bank.
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22Annex: Budget Constraints
1.  Public  Sector
Current Account
DT  +  +  N  +  E  + E-COG'  - SUB 
6)
Top + ic-CRcb  + ic  CRb1,*E.F;,  +PcC  SS
Capital Accoum
E'KOG'  ACR,  + AD  + E-AF;  + S,=  p1,l  +  oKT 5 ADEP,  (7)
I1.  Private  Sector  (Induding  Public  Ent.)
Current Account
+  +,  E-(T  + PR;  W  + +I  i  PBJ,  + iDDDP  +i;  p  (8) =  DT + NMR + iL LNp,  + iC 6 CRP- 1 + E.'(.F;,l  + PR  +2)  +  + Sp
Capital Account
E-F;  E-DFr  + ALP  + ACR,  +.KT  + Sp  (9
prlo  + A,  + ACU  + ADD,  +  .Xp
III.  Central  Bank
Current Account
C*CROb  + t  '.4L  +  ?L.b-  +  E 1R'A-t  =  EC  + E.i'-F;,  + OPC6 + Sh  (10)
Capital Account
E-AF  + &CUP  + ARR  +  DEP,  +Sj 
(11)
= EAR  A+  CR 1,  Aw,  + A&Lmb
23IV.  Commercial Banks
Current Account
C Cb-1  +  =  i  LWb-  4  ID'DDP4 - +  4TDP_I  +  °b  Sb  (12)
Capital Account
ACRb + &CR, + ARR  + ADEP,  (13)
ADEPb  +  b  + ADDP  + Amp  +  AFb  + Sb
IV.  Foreign Sector
Current  Account
Pvw,IM  - pr X  +  '+  f  + r,  +  T;  (14)
=Ei  4-<  +PP4+  4P+t  . +  7  +  T  W  +  C0G)  +  S5
Capital  Account
E.,A  +  SI = E-KOG-  + E-ADFr  + EAF  (15)
24Variable Definitions:
Variables  with an asterisk  are defined in USS. All the variables are expressed in local cuwrncy
at current prices except otherwise specified.  Variables with bars ame.  in general. exogenous.  The
subscripts  g.p,f, and m refer to the goverfment. private. forien., and monetary sectors respectively,  and
the order specifies  the flow of funds  (eg. pf is private to foreign).  The time subscripts  are denoted as t-l
or -1.
BS  Bonds
C  Cspn  (consun  prices)
COG  Cunt  Offca  Grants
CR  Credit frm  the monetay  secto
CUp  Cuecy  in drcltio
DEP,  Govmmem  Depoits
DDJ,  Demiand  deposits
DFI*  Die  foreign invustment
DT  Direct  taxes
E  Average  excang  uste
E-  EiBd-of-peiod exchange ate
F'  Foign  cedit
I  Jneun.e  (constant pDc)
is  Nominal  forei  interest  ra  an frign  creai
SR  Nominal  foreign  inest  ate on reserv
i-  Nominal  antere  m  ran  nxvary  sctr  credit
in  Nomil  intes  rt  on dmamnd  depqlws
ir  Nomial interest  rmatn  tm  deposs
IM  imports  (Constant  prices)
KOG'  Capital official grants
KT  Capital Uunsfets
LN  Crdit  From Cent  Bak
M  Money
NI!  Non-tax revemu
25p  Avaap  GDP  Deflator
PcNI  ,-,v  Dr
pe  Hnd-of-paiod GDP Defa
pwPort  (eport)  ptie  index
P&LU  Dbuted  profit of monetary  so
PRO  Profit  remiuas  to-ftom abod
Re  FotigFrei  s  ms
RR  Ruv  reaqpr_ma
S  Savinp
SUB  Subsidies
T  Cuaa  timfas
77  Tim  dqxoit
77  Indirect tle.
WR-  Works'  remne  from abod
X  EXPos
Y  (DP  at martp  c
r  Inhom  mam Undig  P.ras
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